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This essay ranges over many issues, but it does not survey
exhaustibly the topic of interactions between the less developed
countries (LDCs) and transnational enterprises (TNEs).
of such a topic imposes certain selectivity.

The vastness

Both TNEs and LDCs are

heterogeneous, and even the area of the~r interaction contains great
variety.
TNEs from industrialized countries are interested mainly in
the markets of, and supplies from, industrialized countries.

Substantial

TN£ interest in the third world is limited to a handful of LDCs (which
nevertheless contain a non-trivial share of LDC population); more than
one fifth of the foreign direct investment stock in LDCs in 1975 was
held by oil-producing countries and a further two-fifths by ten other
1/
countries.Only LDCs with large internal markets or significant
natural resources receive sustained attention from TNEs.

Fundamental

issues raised by TNE activities in the world economy should therefore
concern industrial countries as well as LDCs, and the fate of TNEs will
depend more on what happens in industrialized countries than on LDC
policies.

However, LDC-TNE relations are often asymmetrical; a small

and very poor LDC is likely to be of marginal interest to TNEs, but
that LDC policy-makers may attach great importance to TNE decisions
regarding their country.
Both the special assets sustaining the market power of TNEs,
and their motivations for going into LDCs are diverse.

The special asset

may be knowledge of advanced technology or a popular trademark built up
by many years of advertising.

Indeed, under contemporary conditions it

-2seems that even the simplest products (or processes) upon close inspection
turn out to have specialized wrinkles, often of doubtful social benefit,
,giving firms special assets.

The variety is such that the concept of

special assets of firms may become empty without a careful typology.
Motivations for producing within LDCs, rather than exporting to them
either goods or services embodying the special asset, are also variegated,
ranging from jumping import restrictions to preparing for export cheap
LDC resources, such as primary commodities or semiskilled labor.

Given

the diversity of special assets and of the stimuli triggering foreign
investment, one may doubt a priori claims regarding unambiguous welfare
implication of TNE activities.
The ambiguity of the welfare implications of TNE activities is
reinforced by noting the heterogeneity of LDCs, not just in domestic
market size and natural resource endowment, but also in the responsiveness
of their government officials to different domestic social groups and in
the bargaining ability of those officials.

LDC government officials may

or may not bargain cleverly and firmly with TNEs; may or may not focus
their bargaining on substantive issues; and may or may not distribute
equitably the fruits of their bargaining efforts among their fellow
countrymen.
The agnostic approach of this essay is in the spirit of that line
of economic thought teaching that private profit-seeking behavior may lead to
socially desirable results but only if certain conditions are met, conditions
which involve both economic and political variables, and whose presence

cannot be taken for granted, particularly in LDCs.

If there is a simple

formula to understand the nature and consequences of TNEs, this essay
has not found it.

-3Before tackling some specific types of LDC-TNE interaction,
Part I of this essay reviews some of the theorizing and controversies
,about international firms.

Part II discusses TNE activities involving

LDC exports, with examples of the old and of the new.

Part III covers

TNE participation in LDC import-substituting industrialization.

Both

Part II and Part III may be viewed as polar cases of LDC-TNE interaction;
there are, of course, many other types of TNE involvement in LDCs which
are left out, such as those in services and in activities producing
simultaneously for domestic and foreign markets.

Part IV makes a few

additional observations on technological transfer and international rules.
I. The International Firm
Social science has difficulty coming to grips with TNEs.

Tradi

tional economic theory, whether neoclassical or marxist, is uneasy in
the presence of imperfect competition and the modern corporation,

Further

more the sources and diffusion of technical change are typically incor
porated into economic models in a mechanistic fashion.

Finally, standard

democratic theory has little room for "corporate citizens".

Yet much of

the practical debate about TNEs, or large corporations in general, re
volves around their market power, their contribution to innovation and its
diffusion, and their political consequences.

Mainstream theory provides

little guidance in these debates, either in the North or in the South.
Indeed the positive theory of the capitalist, corporate firm used
by many LDC economists, such as Norman Girvan, or by radical economists, such
as the late Stephen Hymer, is close to that advanced by heterodox Northern
economists such as Raymond Vernon and John Kenneth Galbraith.

Such a

theory views the modern corporation as an institution which in its search
for a satisfactory and secure return to its special asset substitutes re
liance on imperfect external markets for internal planning.

The more the

-4firm expands and the larger its investments become (with each new in
vestment often having a longer maturation period), the grea~er will
'be the perceived need to control its economic environment so as to
reduce business and other risks.

Whether the firm commits large funds

to develop a mine or a new product, it will feel the urge to strengthen
a marketing network yielding loyal customers.

Only a lunatic will let

auction (spot) markets decide the fate of multi-billion dollar invest
ment projects.
The corporate commitment to private planning involves reliance on
hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations internalizing informational
networks and encouraging "team spirit".

The right balance between cen

tralization and decentralization will be a major preoccupation of top
management.

Investment decisions, including those in Research and

Development, with horizons well into the future will tend to be centralized.
TNEs are viewed as simply the contemporary culmination of the
tendency for capitalist firms to expand and control their environment.
Dramatic advances in transport and communication over the last one

to national dimensions, and more recently from national to international
dimensions.
The regional-national-transnational expansion path applies in
principle to any capitalist firm, regardless of historical origins or
home country.

The analytical focus is on the firm, not on countries,

nor on an aggregated, homogeneous capital in contrast with some versions
of theories of imperialism and dependency, and with standard nonclassical
theory.

The characteristics of firms at each point in the expansion path

will, of course ,differ; TNEs will be fewer and larger than regional corporations.

-5There is constant movement along the path, both upward and downward,
fueled by technological innovations, oligopolistic rivalries and
'

by political events.
but uneasily.

TNEs sit on top of this swarming pyramid,

Oligopoly remains, but oligopolists may die.

In a

changing world, they must continuously reproduce the barriers to entry
protecting their leading position.
It is important to emphasize that both oligopoly and innovation
are ingredients in this view of capitalist firms and TNEs.

One could

conceptualize oligopoly with given production functions for an unchanging
number of products.

Equilibrium solutions to oligopolistic inter

dependence may then vary according to other specific assumptions, but they
will be inferior to either the classic competitive solution or to state
ownership with marginal cost pricing.

Yet it appears unrealistic to

contemplate oligopoly lasting very long without innovation, generated

by private firms searching for quasi-rents.

The oligopoly-cum-innovation

combination is not easily comparable to the classic competitive solution
nor to public ownership, hence the recurring debate over antitrust and
patents.

It could also be argued that while in the long run it is

difficult to imagine oligopoly without innovation, under contemporary
conditions it is even harder to imagine innovation without oligopoly
for some sectors of the economy.

The process of innovation and its

diffusion need not be predictable nor orderly nor efficient.
Focussing on the firm and on the regional-national-transnational
expansion path does not mean that national boundaries are irrelevant for

understanding TNE activities.

It does remind us that within countries,

particularly large ones like the U.S., there are corporations with plants
scattered geographically to take advantage of transport economies,

-6proximity to customers and domestic market imperfections.

Market im-

perfections, of course, are more severe once national boundaries are
taken into consideration; actual or threatened import restrictions,
factor price inequalities and information gaps are some of the most
obvious ones.
The vision of a contemporary TNE sketched above differs from
the atomistic, price-taking version of the competitive firm found in
introductory (but not industrial organization) textbooks.

It is dif

ferent, but is it better or worse from a normative viewpoint?

On

this

question opinions differ sharply, particularly between Northern and
Southern observers.
John Kenneth Galbraith has put forth perhaps the best case for
large corporations in general and TNEs in particular.~/ The th~sis is
that TNEs naturally arise when international trade consists of modern
technical, specialized, or uniquely styled manufactured products.

Auction

markets may be feasible for wheat or sugar, but electric generators will
involve customer markets and TNEs.l/

When advanced technology is involved,

it is argued that multinational operations realize the economies of scale.
TNEs are credited with favoring freer trade, with a reduction in economic
conflicts among countries where they operate, and even with the creation
of the world's first truly effective international civil service (which
will be news in the Vatican).
Stephen P. Magee has expressed related notions arguing that TNEs
are specialists in the production of information that is less efficient
to transmit through markets than within firms.!±../

TNEs are said to produce

sophisticated technologies because appropriability is higher for these
than for simple technologies.

The appropriability of the returns from

-7information and complementarities among different types of information
dictate large firm size.

Magee concludes that private market generation

pf new information and new techniques may require concentrated industry
structures and large firm size, so that any policy proposal aimed at
increasing private market technology transfer through reducing the market
power of the TNEs via increased intraindustry competition is close to a
contradiction in terms.
Neither Galbraith nor Magee is blind to the dangers posed by the
concentration of power in the large corporation.

Galbraith notes several

danger zones and emphasizes that the large corporation has power both in
. markets and states, giving it the capacity for anti-social action.
notes that:

Magee

"The rational firm will create artificial and sophisticated

masking devices, artificial product differentiation, and expend resources
to appropriate the returns on earlier investments .•• A rational monopolist
or collusive oligopoly will prevent or delay the introduction of a randomly
discovered new unskilled-labor-intens ive technology with low appropriability,
if it is highly substitutable for an existing technology that has a higher
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private present value because of its higher appropriability."-

The

contradiction between private and social rationality could not be expressed
any clearer by a radical economist.
Yet, when all is said, Galbraith and Magee, as well as Kindleberger
and Vernon, end up with relatively complacent views of TNEs.

Compared

with most LDC observers, their evaluation of the evidence will differ in
two crucial areas:

degree of competition in world markets, and the political

power of corporations.
Measures of industrial concentration and market power are notoriously
tricky.

For a given country, the share in all manufacturing value added

(or assets) of the largest 100 firms could point toward greater concentration,

-8while measures of concentration in particular product markets could
show no clear trend.

Furthermore, Vernon argues that conventional

measures of industrial concentration for a national market have become
increasingly inadequate, primarily because such measures have not
captured the buyers' perception of a larger number of substitutable
sources for the products in which the buyers are interested.

For the

world production of eight standardized products, he shows declining
concentration indices between 1950 and 1975, if one takes the TNE
output of each product as a single unit irrespective of where its pro
duction takes place.

This dispersion of industrial leadership could

mean that while the aggregate position of TNEs in a given LDC may be
growing, the market power of each TNE may have declined.~/
Some would argue that rivalry between, say, Japanese and U.S.
TNEs is only a temporary stage, which will eventually lead to a modus
vivendi involving market sharing or even the formation of even larger
(and more truly multinational) units of capital.

Experience so far

indicates that the variety of nationalities of TNEs is one of the most
robust structural bases for the maintenance of competitive pcessuces in
world markets.

One can also foresee that the most advanced semi-indus-

trialized LDCs will enter their own TNEs into these oligopolistic
rivalries.

It has also been noted that besides the rivalry among TNEs

of different nationality the alternatives faced by LDCs in recent years
have been expanded by the entry into the international arena of many new

7/

and relatively small firms from industrialized countries.-

The precise nature of the interaction between private TNE planning
and the performance of markets remains murky and paradoxical.

In some

cases, TNE private planning results in thin and residual open markets

-9for transactions falling outside the TNE closed planning network.

Such

remaining open markets tend to behave erratically; LDCs unwilling to hook
,into TNE networks may have no choice but to go there.

LDC goods exported

via residual markets are particularly vulnerable to the protectionism

of industrialized countries, as they have no TNE friend in court.

For

all international trade, intra-firm trade is already more important than
that carried out among different firms at arms' length.

While there are

difficult problems in defining and measuring intra-firm trade, not to
mention in establishing departures of intra-firm pricing from ideal com
petitive pricing, in a pioneering paper Gerald K. Helleiner concludes that
a very high proportion of U.S. imports from developing countries originates
with "related parties".~./

On the other hand, the scanning TNE central

planning boards may pick up opportunities and economic signals more quickly
than atomistic agents in auction markets could.

Indeed, large corporations

are resented by the abrupt fashion in which they transfer their activities
from, say, high-wage to low-wage areas, presumably a stimulus which would
also have triggered resource reallocation under purely competitive conditions,
but perhaps more gradually.

Put another way, up to a point TNE private

planning may make for fiercer oligopolistic competition in customers' markets.
Charges that international markets are characterized by oligopoly
are sometimes dismissed by Northern observers with the remark that imperfect
markets bear no necessary link to profits, and that profit rates registered
by TNEs do not seem abnormal over the long run, especially when all research
and development expenses are taken into account.

Even if published reports

were reasonably accurate, the remark overlooks the debate over the "perks"
enjoyed by the corporate technostructure , which are of course registered
as expenses, as well as other expenses of doubtful social justification,
such as advertising for building up the image of the corporation.

Within

-10broad limits, the corporate technostructure seems to have considerable
leeway to reward in-group employees; threats from stock.holders or takeovers
by outsiders represent weak checks on executive discretion.

While some argue

that debatable "perks" add up to small sums, or represent normal returns
to investment in human capital, others regard them as key motivations
for setting up barriers to entry.

It may be conjectured that the demon

stt:ation effect of such "perks" motivates some LDC public and private
technocrats in their struggle for a New International Economic Order and
their own bureaucratic hierarchies; the joys of travelling in a Concorde,
and of the three-martini lunch have universal appeal.
Be that as it may, it remains true that while industrialized
countries have legislation curbing abuses of economic power and restraint
of trade, at the international level such regulations,are weaker.
National legislation may exempt international operations from anti-trust
action, or lead to conflicts with other nations leading to sporadic,
ineffectual or inefficient control of monopolistic practices.

The balance

between collusion and competition in international operations is tilted
in the direction of collusion and/or inefficiency by the lack of clear
international anti-trust agreements.
Although it has been noted that the large private corporation does
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not fit easily into democratic theory,-

and there is general recognition

of significant corporate political power in capitalist societies, Northern
observers derive comfort from the countervailing forces at work in pluralistic
industrial nations.

Historical abuses of corporate power are viewed as

aberrations rather than as examples of the norm.

Northern academic

observers frequently rub shoulders with corporate executives in pleasant
surroundings, induced feelings of good fellowship and, in the part of the
academic, a conviction that the limited vision and intellectual range of

-11-

executives must check their potential for really serious mischief.
While Northern observers prefer looking at the future belittling
,the past, history lies heavily on Southern perceptions of the present.
The political and economic abuses of colonialism and hegemonism, the
close and open cooperation between foreign governments and foreign
companies, are viewed not as phenomena which suddenly ended in 1945 or
1955, but which evolved into subtler manipulations and interactions which
are with us today.

ITT-type scandals, which in the North are typically

viewed as aberrations,are regarded in the South as merely the tip of the
iceberg.
Southern observers can argue that the TNE-home government link
is crucial for sustaining a pillar of TNE power, i.e., their technological
advantage.

The major industrialized countries have heavily subsidized

research and development, often under the rubric of defense expenditures,
which later on has provided the basis for corporate prosperity.

A recent

example of such government-corporate alliance is provided by deep-sea
mining, an area in which U.S. private corporations are now benefitting from
defense research carried out earlier by the U.S. government.

Kennecott

Copper Corp., International Nickel Co., Deepsea Ventures Inc., and Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., the four leaders of the seabed mining consortiums, now
loudly complain how bureaucratic red tape, in the form of a proposed
international Law of the Sea, hampers their private enterprise, yet it is
unlikely that they will proceed very far without double-checking their
plans with Washington civilian and military bureaucrats.
TNE corporate power, which in the North is countervailed by trade
unions, consumer organizations and other private and public actors, meets
weaker institutions in LDCs.

Typically it will be the public sector

which will have the role of interlocutor, not always valable.

The energy

-12generated by defensive nationalism may be the most robust countervailing
force offsetting TNE political and social influence in LDCs.
The political and social consequences of TNE presence in LDCs
may be regarded, from the viewpoint of the corporation, as secondary
repercussions of the drive for satisfactory and secure profits.

Further

more, the repercussions are likely to be contradictory, difficult to
foresee and certainly variable among different types of LDCs.

But on

balance, a case can be made that corporate business needs will produce
an attitude favoring authoritarian LDC regimes which repress trade
union activity and consumers organizations.

While right-wing authoritarian

regimes will be most congenial, it should not be surprising if left~wing
authoritarian regimes also become favored, once messy revolutionary
transitions are out of the way and such regimes become interested in
dealing with TNEs.

Business publications show little enthusiasm for

democratic .struggles in the Third World, nor for President Carter's
campaign for human rights.

Business reasons can induce IBM to pull out

of India while maintaining operations in South Africa.

Business reasons

operating within a peculiar European political framework led I,G. Farben
to set. up a branch plant at Auschwitz.
Historical background will make Northern and .Southern observers
react differently to corporate organization charts.

To the Northerner

such charts simply embody commonsensical principles of organization, subject
to tinkering in detail, but whose basic pyramidal structure is rooted

10/
in the wisdom or at least the practice of the ages.-

Southerners view

the pyramid from the base noting that the apex is typically located in
New York or London.

An author like Norman Girvan will reproduce in his

book corporate organization charts which were blandly presented in standard
industrial organization books, but surrounding them with sadomasochistic

-13-

overtones, relating hierarchies to dominance/dependency relationships and

11/
to subjugation.-

Independent traders meeting in an open, competitive

,market can exchange goods and services in an impersonal and standoffish
fashion, but doing business with a TNE will involve becoming enmeshed
into a system of hier.archies and personalized alliances. Such alliances
will have effects spilling beyond the economic life of LDC agents,
influencing their social, cultural and political life.

The "team-spirit"

of the TNE may come to dominate other allegiances of those enmeshed in
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the organization, regardless of their national origins.This section started noting that social science theory has
difficulties handling TNEs.

Robust empirical work on international firms,

not surprisingly, has been sketchy and inconclusive, particularly
regarding their operations in LDCs.

Among other difficulties, a clear

comparison between international and LDC firms, controlling for such
variables as economic activity and size, is seldom possible.

Thus,

whether in general TNEs cause higher levels of economic concentration
in LDCs or whether they earn higher profit rates than local firms remain
debated issues.

Such generalizations may never be possible outside some

kind of typology, to which the rest of the paper turns.

Even with typology,

however, extant empirical work warrants few strong generalizations on the
economic (not to mention political) consequences of TNEs in LDCs.ll/
II. TNEs and LDC Exports
This section will touch on some issues arising from two types of
LDC activities primarily oriented toward foreign markets and involving TNEs.
For minerals the involvement is old and has been declining, at least in
relative terms; for non-traditional LDC exports the involvement is fairly
recent and shows great dynamism.

-14The interaction between TNEs and LDCs in minerals presents in their
purest form some of the themes developed earlier:

the sources of potential

'conflicts are many and substantial, and so is the potential surplus to
be generated and shared.

The rents generated by mineral production can

be divided into three categories:

those arising from the exhaustible

nature of the resource (Hotelling-Solow rents); those arising from dif
ferential qualities of mines, either because of location or of mineral
content of the ores (Ricardian rents); and those arising from oligopolistic
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control of production, processing, and marketing.Throughout history international trade in minerals has been
associated with violence and conflict, and few open and competitive
auction markets.

TNEs, mainly based in countries of substantial power,

arose to replace "market anarchy" for minerals.

For commodities with

high fixed and low variable costs, and where information is imperfect,
badly diffused or asyunnetrically located, it is reasonable to expect a
norunarket institution to replace open markets.

Incentives for vertical

integration become large when uncertainty regarding the supply price of
the upstream good pressures the informational needs of downstream firms.
Once they came into existence, TNEs routinely erected barriers to entry,
including hoarding mineral deposits, limiting technological diffusion and

15/
establishing exclusive processing and marketing networks.-

TNEs

participating in the international trade and investment in minerals engaged
not only in oligopolistic rivalry of a purely commercial nature, but were
also part of international political rivalry.

The symbiotic relationship

between many TNEs and home governments has been clearest perhaps in the
case of oil especially in the years around the First World War and the
decade and a half following the outbreak of the Second World War.

-15Since the second world war, there has been a trend of growing
LDC participation in mineral rents.

This seems best explained, in spite

' of the vagueness of the phrase, by an increase in LDC bargaining power.
Decolonization , super-power political rivalry, economic rivalry among
TNEs of different nationalities, and the expansion of LDC expertise,
knowledge and political awareness have contributed to this trend.

In

retrospect, it could be argued that the characteristics of mineral
industries made the rise of LDC bargaining power almost inevitable.

The

concentration of mines, in contrast with the diffusion in the production
of most tropical crops, made taxable surplus highly visible even to a
"soft state" and, eventually, also vulnerable to the exchequer.
LDCs, and countries such as Australia and Canada, have not only
increased their shares in mineral rents, but by creating their own state
enterprises have also threatened what may be called the commodity
stabilization regimes of the TNEs.

The greater number of actors in world

markets for exhaustible resources promises greater competition and more
choices for consumers.

An expanded role for auction markets, especially

the London Metal Exchange, has been reported in recent years for copper,
aluminum, and nickel.

Those changes to a large extent can be attributed

to LDC assertiveness in the production and marketing of those minerals.
In spite of rhetorical commitment to free markets, nickel and aluminum
TNE executives appear unhappy over the expanding role of the London Metal
16/
Exchange.The presence of LDC firms, whether private or public, in
the marketing of exports, and in services ancillary to LDC foreign trade
(banking, shipping, insurance) represents an important break with the
pattern of foreign domination of such activities, which historically have

17/
been important sources of quasi-rents.-

-16So one possibility for the near future is that with the TNE
commodity stabilization regime in decadence, and no alternative
'regime firmly in place, world markets for exhaustible resources would
become more competitive but also more unstable and unpredictable.
Under these circumstances, prices observed in markets will be poor
guides for fresh investments.

During a transition period which could

be long, the LDC share in world investment and exploration expenditures

18/
in mining would decline, as indeed has happened recently.-

Eventually

the world market would once again become fragmented, as users of raw
materials seeking predictability in prices and in the flow of supplies
would seek special "consumer relationships" with producers.

This could

occur in geographical patterns of the "spheres of influence" type.

For

minerals with substantial production within industrialized countries,
such as copper in the U.S., charges of "dumping" against LDC state
enterprises will encourage protectionism, even as the same countries express
anxiety about access to LDC supplies for other minerals and fuels.
An alternative scenario would feature the emergence of a modus
vivendi between LDC national enterprises, including paper organizations, and
the TNEs.

This collusion between LDCs and TNEs to share in oligopoly

profits is what some observers see as a key feature of OPEC, and what
some see as desirable in the copper case.

The stability of this new partner

ship will depend on other changes in world markets, particularly those

where management, technology and capital can be hired separately, as well
as the will of LDCs to expand their ability to combine all of these inputs.
Note that the discovery and exploitation of new deposits appears to be
increasingly complicated and expensive, and the technological and organiza
tional skills of TNEs may be helpful for such tasks.

Even Vietnam, which

has amply demonstrated its vocation for national autonomy, will deal with

-17TNEs in its search for oil deposits, for example.
There are many other possible futures for international trade
.and investment in minerals and fuels.

In an unlikely fit of rationality

and far-sightedness the various actors could agree to Keynes-ITC

stabilization agreements.

Mongrel proposals, such as the peculiar

International Resources Bank launched in the 1976 UNCTAD Nairobi meeting
by Henry Kissinger, could be revised and adopted, perhaps under the
supervision of the World Bank and regional development banks.
The search for a new order in minerals and fuels is likely to
be a messy and complicated process.

LDC-TNE relations in the area of

minerals and fuels will remain tense and conflictive, even if history
were to be totally forgotten.

As noted by Raymond Vernon, for each

particular deal in minerals or fuels there is an inexorable cycle in
the bargaining strength of TNEs and LDCs.

Lamentations and exhortations

are unlikely to change the dynamics of this cycle, which is based on a
sharp break from a situation of great uncertainty, asymmetries and little
TNE commitment, to a situation of much more information, symmetry as
well as large TNE investments in situ.

The 1974-75 recession and the

slow recovery since then have postponed pressures for that search,
but not for long.

Some Northern voices warn that the search could involve

19/
military action; they may sound archaic but they are not without influence.We now turn to LDC-TNE interaction in the area of non-traditional exports.
Since around the mid-1960s a growing number of LDCs have given greater
incentives to their new exports.

The results have been impressive, even

after the world economy turned sluggish during the mid-1970s, particularly
for about ten semi-industrialized LDCs.

Non-traditional exports are

made up of a broad range of goods, including traditional primary products
now exported with more domestic value added, but its most dynamic component

are manufacturers.

Most of these goods are produced by locally owned

firms, but an important part originate in TNE subsidiaries and a good
share of the marketing of all non-traditional exports is carried out by

foreign firms.

For all LDCs, exports of manufactured products pro

duced by TNEs may not exceed 20 percent, with a higher percentage for
Latin America .and lower one for East Asia.

Contrary to general impressions,

this share apparently has not registered any significant increase since
1966. 201
It is likely that either as producers or merchandisers TNEs will
remain important actors in LDC export drives, thanks inter alia to their
special information and marketing networks, as well as their greater
ability to resist protectionist pressures within their home countries.
Commodities using labor-intensive techniques of production are natural
candidates for exporting, but the drive could include an increasing
share of other goods as well.

A clear and dynamic example of TNE

association with LDC manufactured exports involves subcontracting and
assembly activities, often located in free trade or special border zones.
There are a number of intriguing similarities as well as contrasts
between TNE-LDC old-fashioned interactions in minerals and plantations,
and those recent ones involving labor-intensive exports generated in
free-trade or border zones.
characteristics ,

In both cases the operations have "enclave"

with heavy import dependence and limited linkages into

the domestic economy.

In both cases TNEs control information and

marketing networks to such an extent that host governments have little
idea of prices, costs, and other accounting details.

Under the Cuban

ancien regime, U.S. sugar corporations producing within the island provided
some insurance against protectionist excesses emanating from the U.S.
Congress; a similar role as friend-in-court is now played by Northern TNEs

-19producing or selling LDC labor-intensive goods.

LDC vulnerability may

be even greater in the case of new exports; for minerals and plantations
the presumption is that the LDC has some natural asset not easily found
elsewhere, while cheap unskilled labor is in plentiful supply.

Yet,

plantations, mines, and labor-intensive activities all vent abroad an
LDC surplus which under autarchy would have a low opportunity cost
at home.

So these activities generate rents or quasi-rents which could

be captured partly or totally by private or public host country actors. Under
the right political and geographical circumst~nces, a host-country government can
also control undesirable social and cultural spillovers of such enclave
activities.

Enclaves, in fact, may be very suitable for such vigilance.

While there is a presumption that export-oriented TNE activities
in LDCs will yield net economic benefits to host countries, the magnitude
of benefits could be eroded by overly generous subsidization of social
overhead capital and other inputs, ~uch as credit.

It is not inconceivable

that there may be projects for which the host country gains less from
taxing mineral rents or from returns to labor above opportunity cost,
than what it gives away in subsidized capital.
III. TNEs and LDC Import Substitution
As early as the 1920s some Latin American observers began to dif
ferentiate between two types of inflowing direct foreign investment:

that

associated with exports of minerals and other primary products, and that
going into the nascent import-substituting manufacturing sector.
was more popular than the former.

The latter

Since then, particularly since the

Second World War, much LDC industrialization has been associated with
direct foreign investment and TNEs, and an increasing share of all direct
foreign investment flowing into LDCs has been for manufacturing activities
selling primarily in the protected domestic market.

But early enthusiasm

-20for foreign investment in manufacturing has waned.
International corporations deciding to set up plants in LDCs
'typically took that step after their exports to those countries
were threatened by LDC import barriers of one type or another, i.e.,

in contrast with the case of minerals, most direct investment in
manufacturing became a substitute for trade.

Once an international

corporation took the investment decision, it was not unusual to observe
similar moves, rational from their private viewpoints, by its
oligopolistic rivals.

As the nineteenth century witnessed railroad

manias in country after country, semi-industrialized LDCs have gone
through waves of automobile manias, petrochemical manias, etc.
have learned little from each other in this area.

LDCs

Kenya, for example,

seems to have repeated Argentine excesses regarding TNE-related import
substitution.
While during the 1930s and 1940s the combination of import
restrictions and inflows of direct investment into manufacturing had a
number of redeeming features, the more prosperous world conditions of
later years highlighted its negative aspects.

Foreign-owned plants

benefitted from exhorbitant effective rates of protection in many cases,
shielding both excess costs and profits.

Even without excess profits,

it is not difficult to show in a simple neoclassical model that a small
tariff-imposing country importing a capital-intensive good will see
its welfare reduced by an inflow of foreign capital.

While the presence

of foreign capital increases claims on exportable goods, required for the
real transfer of (normal) profits abroad, the combination of tariffs
and capital inflow will distort the productive structure in the direction

21/

of importable goods.-

-21In a more realistic model which recognizes that the small country
deals with a foreign firm with monopolisti c power, perhaps due to the
1

firm's special asset, it can be shown that an import tariff which
does not induce a decision by the foreign firm to produce locally could
lead to the small country being better off than either having a zero
tariff, or one so high that it triggers a capital inflow for import

substitutio n.

If the "switchover " tariff is less than the optimal tariff

when only imports are contemplate d, the small country could maximize
its welfare by prohibiting subsidiary production ("switchove r") and
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imposing the optimal tariff on imports.The venerable infant industry argument was sometimes used to
defend protection and other subsidizatio n of the local activities of
TNEs.

Common sense soon began to question whether the learning-by -doing

of infants bearing names such as General Motors and Ford be subsidized
by local consumers.

A related debate involved the desirability of

regulating the sale to TNEs of matured locally-own ed enterprises , which
had been nurtured through infancy and adolescence by direct and indirect
public subsidies.
While many investments by TNEs in the import-sub stituting sector
of LDCs could pass an ex-post social cost-benefi t test, a large number
could not.

Major blame for this situation, of course, rests with host

country policies, but TNEs and their home-govern ments were not passive
spectators to LDC policy making on import restriction s and the number
of TNEs permitted in a given industry.

TNEs lobbied for greater pro

tection, as firms would, but perhaps with greater than average persuasive
powers.

When in their attempt to limit entrants in a new field LDCs

left out TNEs of some nations, home-countr y embassies often would express

-22their unhappiness, sometimes making references to limitations being
placed on competition.

Once the TNEs settle behind protective walls,

'they will resist changes in the status quo.
I would conjecture that the inefficiency of much TNE investment
in the import competing sector of LDCs lies behind many complaints
and criticisms of TNE practices in the third world.

Much of the dis

cussion on transfer pricing, for example, arises in the context of
industries which receive significant and reliable protection thanks to
tariffs and import controls, yet feel hampered by exchange controls from
freely remitting their profits abroad.

The latter restrictions are

justified by the former privileges, yet inevitably the combination
induces cat-and-mouse games besides providing rich possibilities for
imaginative though socially unproductive practices.

The real surplus

generated by TNEs in the import substituting activity is insufficient
to satisfy both the company's profit aspirations, expressed in convertible
foreign exchange, as well as host country expectations in areas such
as taxation, employment and externalities.

Similar remarks can be

made about the inconclusive debate on whether or not TNEs use appropriate

technology in their plants, or about the balance of payments effects of
TNEs.

Surely debates over appropriate technology or balance of payments

effects are more muted, say in TNE activities in oil than in manufacturing.
TNE involvement in the local production of some of the most
sophisticated or novel lines of LDC consumption has also raised the appro
priate product issue.

Since at least last century, some economists have

viewed the introduction in LDCs of new consumer goods, either via imports
or local production, as a spur to development.

This view stresses the

incentive effects as well as the linkages of the new consumption habits.

-23In recent years a critical interpretation portraying TNEs as purveyors
of consumerism has gained prominence.

The new gadgets are said to be

limited to consuming elites, as in the case of automobiles, but in
other cases are charged with distorti~mass consumption toward products
of dubious nutritional or aesthetic worth, such as soda pop, corn
flakes, filtered cigarettes, and plastic bags, to the detriment of goods
rooted in local tradition and sound habits, such as mother's milk, cigars
and handicrafts.

1NEs and their retinue of public relations firms blitz

local culture until the old ways are seen to be backward and shameful,
while consumption of TNE goods becomes a sign of modernity and sophistication.
Local production of the new goods promotes their use by swelling local.
pride at being at the frontier of progress, and by the knowledge that
employment is being generated.

Attempts by some TNEs to adapt their products

to LDC circumstances and needs, as in the case of nutritious soft drinks
or smaller and simpler autos and hotels, are regarded as exceptions proving
the rule.

The commercial success of such exceptions has been mixed.

The economic and political complexities found in TNE involvement
in LDC import-substitu ting industrializati on become even more acute when
LDCs attempt to expand the size of the protected market by the creation
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of customs unions.It is recognized that TNEs could be powerful
instruments of integration; indeed so powerful that they may lead the process
to their great gain, and with repercussions the host countries regard as
undesirable.

When a group of these countries had been following, each

on their own, policies of import substitution, a common market could
bring about significant gains by rationalizing existing activities (i.e.,
trade creation).

If existing plants are owned by TNEs, they may oppose

the process, but some may go along with it expecting to cut costs and

-24increase profits.

Such long run real productivity gains may be shared

between TNEs and host countries, and among host countries, in various
and not easily predictable ways.

When the customs union aims at

creating new activities (i.e., trade diversion), the host countries

will naturally hope to retain as much of the perceived benefits from
the enlarged market as possible, squeezing the maximum concessions from
new TNE entrants.
investment code.

Hence the establishment of such regulations as the Andean
But the less efficient the new investment plans the

more likely it is that the bargaining between LDCs and TNEs, and among
the partner countries, will be time consuming and mystifying.
IV. Technology and R~les
This last section will say a few more words on the subject of
TNEs and technological transfer to LDCs, and will raise the question
whether the bargaining between TNEs and LDCs can be aided by international
rules.
Reliable empirical evidence on the different channels of tech
nological diffusion and on the varying costs of each channel to receiving
countries is not plentiful.

What seems clear is that TNEs are neither

the only nor necessarily the cheapest (for LDCs) mechanism for tech
nological diffusion.

Producers of machinery,cons ultants, students, and

specialized publications are some of the other conduits of technological
diffusion, which under some circumstances become attractive alternatives
to parts of the TNE package.
One should note that a TNE presence in LDC manufacturing, by itself,
is no evidence of technological diffusion to LDC residents; it is only a
geographical fact.

At one extreme the TNE may keep to itself all relevant

-25knowledge, leaving local residents as ignorant of the technology as if
they were importing the product.

At the other extreme, the TNE presence

~ould lead to a costless copying of its technological advantage by
competing local entrepreneurs, although.it is difficult to see why the
TNE would actively promote such a process.

TNEs could, however, promote

technical improvement among local producers supplying inputs to the TNE.
A low-cost and rapid diffusion, involuntary and undesirable from the
viewpoint of most TNEs,is most likely to occur in large semi-industrialized
LDCs than in small and very poor LDCs.
The peculiarities of technological knowledge as a commodity
make both LDCs and industrialized countries perceive that they are cheated
by the somewhat metaphysical international technology market.

Anxious

OECD countries have been flirting with technological protectionism, dis
covering suddenly all sorts of imperfections and externalities.

Fortunately,

the various channels of technological diffusion provide some defense against
this type of protectionism·, which at least since the Industrial Revolution
has not been successful for long.
Granting these caveats, TNEs remain one of the important parti
cipants in the international technological market, reluctant to share their
special technological assets with outsiders, but less secretive regarding
technologies not fundamental to their quasi-rents.
forces in the generation of fresh innovations.

They are also important

Their dual role will keep

them in a delicate position in the struggle between Southern forces pro
moting low-cost technological diffusion, and Northern efforts to maintain
and extend technological leadership, whose quasi-rents make up part of
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the higher N9rthern ~ capita income-;- This struggle is unlikely to yield
orderly patterns.

Already in 1960 Albert O. Hirschman was noting a

secular trend toward a continuous shortening of the time needed for a

-26new industry to become footloose, comparing the historical spread of
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textiles, chemicals, automobiles, antibiotics and transistors.1He challenged the view that the "imitators" would follow the "talented
innovators" only at a respectful distance and with well-adjusted speed,

and only to occupy positions of comparative advantage which the in
novators were more or less ready to yield.

It is interesting that

the notion of a neat and orderly separation of the world between
talented innovators and timid followers, which some regard as the implicit
ideology of U.S. foreign economic policy during the post-Second
World-War period, reappears in some of the dependency literature which
takes for granted LDC technological serfdom, barring profound socio
economic structural changes.
One can note in passing the emergence and rapid growth of a new
source of technology for LDCs:

26/
other LDCs.-

Significant adaptive

technological efforts have been carried out in several semi-industrialized
LDCs, leading to new wrinkles in manufacturing production processes making
them more suitable to smaller markets, or taking advantage of secondhand machinery, or adapting to lower quality raw materials and intermediate
products.

There are also examples of product changes.

Such technological

niches were often carved out by LDC firms engaged in import-substitution
which are now in the position to exploit their special asset either by
exporting, licensing or investing in other LDCs.
Bargaining between LDCs and TNEs, whether over Hotelling-Solow
and Ricardian rents, or over technological marketing quasi-rents or over
rents generated by protection, is likely to remain rough and bitter.
The normal rate of return to capital found in theoretical constructs is
not easily definable in concrete, ever-changing circumstances.

Policies

of individual LDC governments toward TNEs will no doubt continue to

-27fluctuate, sometimes erratically, depending on whether a given LDC
has been most recently impressed by TNE excesses, or by the difficulties
,and frustrations of effectively running the apparatus of control

over foreign investors.

But the secular trend is unlikely to be

away from growing LDC assertiveness, with public sectors continuing

to be the host country major counterparts to TNEs in the bargai~ing
game.

Under these circumstances, rhetoric and debate will also remain

apocalyptic.

LDCs will continue to be lectured on the dangers of

killing the celebrated goose.

Yet despite occasional confiscations

(in most cases amply covered by ex-ante risk premia) and despite threats
to let LDCs stew in their own juice, a substantial number of TNEs will
keep knocking at some LDC doors.
Unless one wishes to see the contradictions between LDCs and
TNEs (or, more generally, between TNEs and governments) ending up in
a drastic systemic change in the world economy, it is natural to imagine
reforms in the international economic order which would reduce the dead
weight losses, irrationalities, and abuses existing in this area.

The

modest proposals put forth by·OECD and UNCTAD attempt to bring into the
international jungle some of the rules and regulations on corporations
which have been common in advanced industrialized countries for many years.
These include standards of disclosure and accounting, regulation of
restrictive business practices, codes on corrupt practices, and cooperation
among tax authorities of different countries.

More ambitious proposals

would culminate in a GATT-type of organization to regulate and oversee
TNE activity. It is remarkable that weak proposals on disclosure of
information, ~ven when coming from OECD, have met with hostility from TNEs
and some of their home countries.±2/

In the context of the North-South

dialogue it could also be useful to review Northern legislation regarding

-28access to national capital markets and patents to see whether it
unnecessarily tends to limit open-market alternatives to TNEs.
In this as in other arenas of international economic interaction
we are still witnessing the consequences of the paradox Lionel

Robbins identified in classical liberal thought.

He noted that the

famous liberal harmony of individual actions was only a harmony because
legal restraints and institutions created at the national level an
arena in which it might emerge.

The laissez faire of English classical

thought demanded a strong national state.

But when dealing with inter

national problems, liberalism adopted a different attitude; when
relations between different states were concerned, its attitude became
that of philosophical anarchism, or tacit reliance on an imperial or

28/
hegemonic power for policing the international economy.The outlook for the emergence of generally accepted rules and
regulations for international firms is not promising.

Even among highly

industrialized nations there are growing mutual recriminations regarding
unfair behavior; witness especially criticisms of Japanese firms and their
trade practices.

As "two, three, more Japans" emerge, each with its own

cultural style, these problems are likely to multiply.

Established old

oligopolists are unlikely to acconnnodate smoothly to the rise of lean and
"ill-mannered" new oligopolists.

Rather than universal rules of the

game, new political and economic subsystems of bewildering variety could
emerge.
To most LDC policy makers these systemic preoccupations are
likely to appear premature.

Their key preoccupation must remain the

exact role, if any, TNEs can play in accelerating development in their
countries.

Governments of LDCs with both political will and local

expertise will naturally be in a better position to guide and control

-29TNE specific contributions to their country's development than those
of LDCs lacking both or either.

The latter will be unable to look

'too carefully into the package TNEs bring in.

The depackaging of the

TNE bundle is not an easy task, and the governments of the poorest LDCs
may for many years be satisfied in obtaining just tax revenues and employment
from TNE operations.

Even the more advanced LDCs which are quite able

to, say, run on their own existing new mines, may choose to call on
TNEs to help them in opening up new mines. _For some projects depending
on continuous access to new technology LDC negotiators may prefer some
TNE equity participation over a simple licensing agreement, so as to
obtain a longer range TNE commitment to the venture.
On the whole, the arguments presented in this paper imply that,
suitably directed by responsible host country planning and channeled
selectively, TNEs can contribute to achieving specific developmental
targets by supplying clearly defined services and expertise.

The

international economy of the 1970s, with all its problems, has allowed
greater flexibility to many LDCs in choosing between TNE packages and
alternative ways of reaching economic goals, in contrast with the
international economy of the 1950s or those of earlier decades.

LDC

selectivity regarding TNEs should become as expected and acceptable in
the international community as the selectivity industrialized countries
apply to immigrant labor.
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